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Abstract 
The paper seeks to characterise the monetary policy decision making process for Sri Lanka 
using standard Taylor-type monetary policy rules.  Alternative monetary policy reaction 
functions are estimated for Sri Lanka over the period 1996Q1 to 2013Q2.  An open economy 
reaction function is used in the analysis where the central bank is assumed to respond to 
changes in inflation, the output gap and the exchange rate.  A forward looking specification 
of the reaction function is found to provide the most appropriate characterisation of policy 
making at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  The results indicate that the size of the coefficient 
on the inflation gap has increased over time reflecting a greater focus on price stability.  
However, the response of monetary policy to fluctuations in output has been greater than the 
response to deviations in inflation reflecting the central bank’s preference and the lower 
sensitivity of output to interest rate changes.   
JEL Classification Numbers: C22, E43, E52 
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Policy Interest Rates, Monetary Policy Reaction Function, 
Taylor Rule 
  
                                                
1
 Roshan Perera is a Deputy Director and Vishuddhi Jayawickrema is an Economist in the Economic Research 
Department, Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  Corresponding author: roshan@cbsl.lk. The views expressed in this 
paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.   
 
  
3 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
The goals of monetary policy determine what constitutes optimal monetary policy.  In many 
central banks the final goal of monetary policy is to maximise welfare by maintaining 
inflation at a low and stable level and by reducing the deviation of actual output from its 
potential.  However, having a target or goal for monetary policy alone does not guarantee 
that the target would be met.  Further there are multiple instruments that could be used to 
achieve a given target.  Determining the optimal monetary policy is an issue that central 
banks have to constantly address.  Given the importance of the policy decisions facing 
central banks a large literature has been developed which has tried to characterise the 
relationship between the central bank’s monetary policy instrument and the central bank’s 
objectives using monetary policy reaction functions. In the New Keynesian tradition, central 
banks are characterised as conducting monetary policy to stabilise inflation and to reduce the 
output gap2 (Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1999, 2000; Svensson, 1999, 2002).3  Empirical 
studies have been carried out to determine the extent to which the rules proposed in 
theoretical models such as the New Keynesian model actually reflect the conduct of 
monetary policy in central banks.  The ‘Taylor Rule’ which was proposed in Taylor (1993) 
was considered the most appropriate characterision of monetary policy making by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of the USA (Fed) during the period 1987 to 1992.  According to the 
Taylor rule, the Fed’s monetary policy instrument - the interest rate - was set in response to 
deviations of actual inflation from a targeted level and actual output from its potential level. 
Empirical estimates of the monetary policy rule for the Fed showed that the behavior of the 
interest rate as determined by the monetary policy rule was closely related to the actual path 
of the Federal Funds Rate during the period for which the estimation was carried out.   
Estimates from monetary policy reaction functions provide valuable insights into how 
central banks have conducted monetary policy in the past, while guiding central banks in the 
setting of appropriate interest rates in various macroeconomic environments.  With the shift 
to inflation targeting frameworks an increasing number of central banks have adopted a 
more rule based approach to monetary policy decision making.  A key feature of inflation 
targeting is that it leads to a more systematic response of central banks to inflation.  When 
central banks commit to following a rule they overcome the time inconsistency problem 
associated with discretionary monetary policy making. Central banks that are guided by 
policy rules are also able to better communicate their policy actions to the market.  The 
greater predictability in the behaviour of central banks has thus improved the transmission of 
monetary policy.  Rules based decision making also increases the accountability of central 
                                                
2
 The output gap is measured as the gap between actual output (y) and potential output (y*) expressed as a ratio 
of potential output [(y-y*)/y*], where potential output is defined as a level of output that can be sustained over 
a period of time without generating inflationary or deflationary pressures  
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 In emerging market economies, central banks are also found to respond to movements in the exchange rate 
(Mohanty and Klau, 2004).   
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banks and enhances the credibility of future policy actions.  The breakdown of the direct 
relationship between money supply growth and inflation has also led to more emphasis 
being placed on Taylor type rules in the conduct of monetary policy (Blinder, 2006).  The 
shift towards more rule based monetary policy making was intended to mitigate the impact 
on the economy of monetary and other shocks and thereby reduce the emergence of crises. 
Although rules are a simplification of the monetary policy decision making process of 
central banks it has been found to provide a fairly good approximation of the monetary 
policy actions of central banks around the world.  Empirically estimating monetary policy 
reaction functions help describe the monetary policy decision making of central banks and 
determine the extent to which they approximate rule-based behaviour.  It enables an analysis 
of how far the actual conduct of monetary policy deviates from that prescribed by rules.   
In this paper we seek to estimate alternative monetary policy reaction functions for Sri 
Lanka over the period 1996 to 2013:Q2.  Although the objectives of monetary policy and 
monetary operations have changed over this period, the short term interest rate has reflected 
by and large the changes in the monetary policy stance of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.   
Section II provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature relating to 
monetary policy rules and in section III the monetary policy framework in Sri Lanka and its 
evolution over time are discussed.  Section IV provides a discussion of the methodology 
adopted and sets out the alternative specifications of the monetary policy reaction functions.  
In section V the data used in the estimation are described and the results from the empirical 
analysis are presented and discussed.  The final section concludes and discusses some policy 
implications and areas for further research.   
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the optimsation problem, central banks are assumed to minimise a loss function by 
stabilising inflation around an inflation target and stabilising output around potential 
(Svennson, 1999).                           
where,    is inflation,    is the targeted level of inflation,    is actual output and    is the 
potential output.  The value placed on the coefficient   indicates the relative preference of 
the central bank towards stabilising inflation or output.  Central banks that have greater 
preference for inflation stabilisation would have a lower value for   while central banks that 
place greater weight on output and employment stabilisation would have a larger value for  .   
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The rule proposed in Taylor (1993) was derived as a solution to the optimisation problem of 
central banks.  In the original version of the Taylor rule, the policy rate was set as a function 
of a deviation of inflation from target and the actual output from potential or the output gap4.                             
where it is the nominal policy interest rate, πt is the inflation rate, π* is the targeted or 
desired rate of inflation, r* is the average equilibrium real interest rate, yt is actual y* is the 
estimated potential output level.   
The monetary policy rule provides a guide to how much the central bank should change its 
policy interest rate in response to deviations of inflation and output from target or potential, 
respectively.  The weights assigned by central banks to the objectives of inflation and output 
are reflected in the coefficients for the output gap and inflation gap. The relative weights 
assigned by central banks to the inflation gap and the output gap would depend on the 
preference of central banks as well as their legal mandates.  The coefficient on the output 
gap shows the trade-off between output and inflation with a higher coefficient on the output 
gap indicating lower output variance. Clarida et al 2000 in an empirical analysis for the US 
find that policymakers did not obey the Taylor principle during the 1970s and 1980s, while 
their theoretical analysis suggests that the failure to obey the Taylor principle led to 
indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium and possible sunset equilibria.  Hence, 
they conclude that the greater macroeconomic volatility experienced during that period was 
due to poor policymaking.  A fundamental requirement for stability in theoretical models is 
the adherence to the ‘Taylor principle’, which is the rise in the nominal interest rate more 
than one for one with inflation.  This requires central banks to raise policy interest rates by 
more than the increase in inflation, resulting in a rise in the real interest rate, which would 
help dampen aggregate demand and bring inflation back to the targeted level5. Failure to 
obey the Taylor principle leads to indeterminancy of rational expectations equilibrium and 
possible sunset equilibria in theoretical models.  Empirically it has been associated with 
greater macroeconomic volatility.  The estimated magnitude of the coefficient φ provides an 
important yardstick for evaluating a central bank’s policy reaction function.   
Patra and Kapur (2010) estimating alternative monetary policy rules for India find that the 
dominant focus of monetary policy is inflation, which is accompanied by a strong 
commitment to the stabilisation of output.   
                                                
4
 According to the reaction function formulated for the US Federal Reserve Bank in Taylor (1993) the Fed was 
assumed to adjust the Federal Funds Rate according to the following rule:                         , 
where the inflation target was assumed to be 2 per cent and the constant real interest rate was also assumed to 
be 2 per cent.   
5
 This requires that the long run coefficient on inflation be greater than one (φ> 1).   
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There are several issues that need to be addressed when estimating a monetary policy rule.  
A choice needs to be made regarding the measure of inflation and the output gap6 to be used 
in the estimation.  Orphanides (1999, 2001) find a high degree of incertainty surrounding 
output gap estimates particularly when there are large deviations between real time data and 
final revised data.  A decision needs to be made regarding the timing of information flows 
which will in turn determine whether contemporaneous, lagged or forward looking variables 
are used in the analysis.  In estimating forward looking specifications of the monetary policy 
rule a choice needs to be made whether actual or forecasted values are to be used.   
A choice also needs to be made whether interest rate smoothing behavior of central banks 
should be taken into consideration.  The monetary policy rule proposed by Taylor was 
modified to take into consideration the interest rate smoothing behaviour of central banks 
(Judd and Rudebusch, 1998; Clarida et al, 2000; Paez-Farrell, 2000)7.  Central banks 
typically change policy rates gradually to avoid sharp shocks to financial markets and to 
reduce the possible risk of inaccurate policy actions which may then require a reversal of 
policy actions which in turn could lead to a loss of credibility.  The uncertainty of the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism and the parameters linking the changes in the 
policy instrument with the key variables in the economy as well as the uncertainty 
surrounding the models used by central banks linking the variables of interest, have made 
central banks cautious in their monetary policy making, to ensure they don’t create any 
undue volatility by wrongly responding to macroeconomic developments.  Patra and Kapur 
(2010) find a high degree of interest rate smoothing in the case of India.  Many empirical 
studies estimating the monetary policy rule find that the lagged interest rate is highly 
significant indicating that the policy adjusts gradually to changes in macroeconomic 
conditions (English et al 2003).    
Open economy policy functions including the response of policy makers to the exchange 
rate have been developed to characeterise monetary policymaking in emerging market and 
developing economies, particularly considering the importance of the exchange rate in these 
economies.  The exchange rate takes on greater importance for emerging market and 
developing economies because the pass through from the exchange rate to domestic inflation 
is high and the exchange rate is important for a country to maintain its external 
competitiveness (Mohanty and Klau, 2004).  Estimating a standard open economy monetary 
policy reaction function for 13 emerging market economies, they find that in many of these 
countries while monetary policy has increasingly focused on price stability, they also find a 
strong response of interest rates to the exchange rate.  In the case of India, Patra and Kapoor 
(2010) find that in most specifications of the monetary policy rules estimated, the exchange 
                                                
6
 This includes making a choice about how potential output is to be measured.  
7
 Reviews of the interest rate smoothing behaviour of central banks can be found in Lowe and Willis (1997), 
“The Smoothing of Official Interest Rates, Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting”, Reserve Bank of 
Australia, pp287-312 and Sack and Wieland (1999), “Interest Rate Smoothing and Optimal Monetary Policy: 
A Review of Recent Empirical Evidence”, Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, 
Washington D.C. 
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rate is found to be insignificant which they conclude is a reflection of the Reserve Bank of 
India’s approach to exchange rate management, wherein the policy rate is not used to target 
a level or band of the exchange rate. McCauley (2006) who estimates a monetary policy rule 
for Thailand find that the policy rate does not respond to changes in the exchange rate.  
However, he concludes that this does not imply that the authorities are not concerned about 
the exchange rate but rather that they have other instruments to deal with the exchange rate.   
The time horizon adopted by the central bank as well as the view regarding the transmission 
of monetary policy would determine whether the specification of the monetary policy rule 
should be forward looking, backward looking or contemporaneous. Lags in the transmission 
of monetary policy have made forward looking specifications of the monetary policy rule 
more attractive (Batini and Haldane, 1999).  A monetary policy reaction function 
incorporating forward looking behaviour of agents and taking into consideration rational 
expectations of agents was considered the most preferred specification for the US, Japan and 
the UK by Clarida et al (1998).  On the other hand, Taylor and William (2010) estimate 
contemporaneous specifications of the monetary policy rule incorporating only information 
about recent behaviour of inflation and output.  Judd and Rudebusch (1998) estimate 
backward looking specifications of the monetary policy rules and according to Rotemberg 
and Woodford (1999) backward looking rules are quite good approximations of optimal 
policy.  The timing of information available to policy makers when they make policy 
decisions would be another factor to be considered when determining whether 
contemporaneous or lagged variables are used to estimate the policy reaction function. 
In the estimation of the Taylor rule it is not without its critiques.  According to McCallum 
(1993) the Taylor rule is not ‘operational’ as it requires policymakers to have information 
that is not necessarily available at the time monetary policy decisions are made.  The 
criticism relates to the timing of information on inflation and the output gap that is available 
to policymakers at the time decision are made.  Orphanides (1999, 2001) highlights the issue 
with the measurement of the output gap which is an unobservable variable.  He observes that 
there is a high degree of uncertainty surrounding output gap estimates particularly when 
there are large deviations between real time data and final revised data.  In practice, 
however, in the absence of real time data, ex-post data is commonly used to estimate 
monetary policy rules.   
In applying the Taylor rule there are issues that need to considered.  According to Greenspan 
(1997) monetary policy rules are at best “guideposts” to central banks, not inflexible rules 
that eliminate discretion. The reason he gives for this is because the outcome of these rules 
depend on some “key variables” primarily, the equilibrium real interest rate and the 
estimation of potential output of the economy which are based on an analysis of historic 
data.  However, as he puts it “…history is not an infallible guide to the future, and the levels 
of these two variables are currently under active debate.”   
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III.   MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK IN SRI LANKA 
The mandate of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has evolved with the economic and financial 
developments in Sri Lanka as well as the evolution of central banking around the world.  In 
the Monetary Law Act No. 58 of 1949 (MLA) under which the Central Bank of Sri Lanka 8 
was established, the Bank was mandated with multiple objectives of stabilising the domestic 
monetary value and the exchange rate of the Sri Lanka rupee vis-à-vis foreign currencies, 
promoting a high level of production, employment and real income and encouraging and 
promoting the full development of the productive resources of the country.  In 2002, an 
amendment to the MLA redefined the objectives of the Central Bank whereby the multiple 
objectives of the Central Bank were replaced with two objectives: economic and price 
stability and financial system stability.   
 
Similarly the monetary policy framework, in which Sri Lanka has operated, as in the case of 
most other countries, has evolved over time.  From its inception to the early 1980s the 
Central Bank adopted a more dirigiste approach to managing the economy by imposing 
direct controls on credit and interest rates with a view to encouraging identified sectors in 
the economy and imposing strict exchange controls.  The focus during this period was 
economic development even at the cost of high inflation.  The liberalisation of the economy 
in 1977 set the stage for the move away from direct instruments to more market oriented 
monetary policy instruments.  The ascendance of Monetarists economics led to an increasing 
recognition of the long run relationship between monetary growth and inflation.  In the 
1980s the Central Bank formally adopted a monetary targeting policy framework.  Under 
this policy framework the Central Bank seeks to achieve its final objectives, by conducting 
monetary policy so as to maintain reserve money, the Bank’s operating target, at a level that 
is consistent with a desired growth of broad money, the Bank’s intermediate target.  The 
efficacy of this policy framework depends entirely on there being an identifiable relationship 
between money supply growth and inflation which is econometrically determined by testing 
for the stability of the money demand function. The development of the financial system and 
financial innovations saw many central banks moving away from monetary targeting to 
inflation targeting type policy frameworks. The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has also stated 
that it is gradually refining its policy framework towards an inflation targeting type 
monetary policy framework which does not depend on a strict relationship between money 
and inflation.  With the shift from a crawling band exchange rate regime to a floating 
exchange rate system in January 2001, the role of the exchange rate for stabilisation has 
reduced and reserve money became the nominal anchor of monetary policy.   
 
In the conduct of monetary policy there has been a move away from direct instruments to 
more market oriented instruments with greater reliance placed on open market operations 
(OMO) as the main instrument of monetary policy.  Although initially OMO were ‘passive’ 
in that the Central Bank offered unlimited repurchase (repo) and reverse repurchase (reverse 
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 It was known as the Central Bank of Ceylon until 31 December 1985.   
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repo) facilities to counterparties which they could avail at their discretion, to improve the 
conduct of monetary policy the Central Bank moved to a system of more active open market 
operations in March 2003.  In this new system monetary policy is conducted to maintain 
reserve money around a targeted level while ensuring that the short term interest rate is 
maintained at a level which is compatible with the target of reserve money (Wijesinghe, 
2006).  A key element of this new system was the establishment of an interest rate corridor 
formed by the lower bound of the overnight Repurchase (repo) rate and the upper bound by 
the overnight Reverse Repurchase (reverse repo) rate.  Monetary policy operations are 
conducted to maintain the overnight interest rate (call market rate) at around the middle of 
the corridor.  With the move to more active open market operations the overnight call 
market rate and consequently the interest rate channel took on a more important role in the 
transmission of monetary policy.  Although reserve money continues to be the operating 
target of monetary policy, policy interest rates and specifically the policy interest rate 
corridor is the main instrument used to signal the monetary policy stance of the Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka.   
 
Figure 1: Frequency of Policy Interest Rate and SRR Changes 2000 - 2013 
 
 
Estimating a monetary policy rule for Sri Lanka is not straightforward given the changes in 
the conduct of monetary policy.  Although reserve money continues to be the target of 
monetary policy there has been a shift towards the use of the interest rate corridor to signal 
the stance of monetary policy. Further with the developments in financial markets there has 
been an improvement in the transmission of policy rates to other interest rates further 
justifying the use of the interest rate as the policy instrument.  Difficulties arise in estimating 
a monetary policy rule for Sri Lanka as it requires measuring potential output which is 
unobserved and could change due to structural changes taking place in the economy.   
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IV.   METHODOLOGY 
Several alternative specifications of the policy reaction function were estimated for Sri 
Lanka.  A contemporaneous specification of the form given in equation (1) was estimated.  
The estimation results are given in Annex II.  In the light of Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) finding that backward looking specifications of the Taylor 
rule are relatively good approximations of optimal policy, a backward looking specification 
of a monetary policy rule of the form set out in equation (2) was estimated.                                                                      (1) 
where    is the short term interest rate or the policy rate of the central bank,    is the year on 
year rate of inflation,    is the desired level of inflation,        is the output gap,     is the 
change in the nominal exchange rate and     is a random disturbance term.  
                                                                                 (2) 
However, given the lags in the transmission of monetary policy, in practice central banks are 
found to be more forward looking in their decision making.  Hence, a forward looking 
monetary specification of the policy reaction function of the form set out in equation (3) was 
also estimated.                                                                                     (3) 
In the empirical literature (Clarida et al, 2000, Paez-Farrell, 2009) the interest rate 
smoothing behaviour of central banks is taken into consideration by including a lagged value 
of the interest rate.   
Exchange rate smoothing has also been found to be an important consideration in the policy 
reaction function of emerging economies (Mohanty and Klau, 2004).  Given Sri Lanka is a 
small open economy which is highly sensitive to movements in the exchange rate, a reaction 
function including the exchange rate was chosen as the preferred specification.  
 
V.   DATA DESCRIPTION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Quarterly data for the period 1996:Q1 to 2013:Q2 was used for the analysis.  The choice of 
the sample period was determined by the availability of quarterly data for GDP.  Details of 
the data series are given in Annex I and Table 1, while the stylised facts of the variables and 
a summary of the descriptive statistics of the data series are found in Tables 2 and 3 of 
Annex I.  Empirical estimation of a Taylor rule requires a priori determination of three 
parameters: the desired level of inflation, potential output and equilibrium real policy rate.  
With regard to the choice of an inflation measure, there are several alternative measures of 
inflation computed for Sri Lanka, such as the Colombo Consumer Price Index (CCPI), the 
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Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and the GDP deflator.  Since the most widely accepted 
measure of inflation is the CCPI, the year on year change in the CCPI, is the inflation 
measure used in the analysis. The desired rate of inflation has been set at 5 per cent for the 
entire period of analysis.9   
The year on year change in inflation as measured by CCPI had an average of 10.0 per cent 
over the sample period 1996 to 2013:Q2. The inflation gap, which is the difference between 
the actual inflation and the desired inflation, recorded a mean of 5.0 during the period under 
consideration. The descriptive statistics of the data series were also analysed by dividing the 
entire sample into two subsamples to evaluate the changes that have taken place since 2008. 
Notably, the average inflation gap during the period 2008 to 2013:Q2 was 4.09 per cent, 
which was lower than the average inflation gap of 5.44 per cent during the period 1996 to 
2007.  
The mean of the alternative measures of short term interest rates, namely the effective policy 
rate, the average weighted call market rate and the 91-day Treasury bill rate were 11.3 per 
cent, 11.6 per cent and 11.7 per cent respectively during the sample period 1996 to 2013:Q2. 
Reflecting the movement in inflation, the average interest rates have also declined during the 
period 2008 to 2013:Q2 from the rates prevailing during the period 1996 to. Meanwhile, the 
average depreciation in the exchange rate was 5.1 per cent during the entire sample period, 
and was also found to be lower in the latter subsample compared to the former. 
 
Figure 2: Inflation (Spliced Index) 
 
 
                                                
9
 It is recognised that this rate may not have been the Central Bank of Sri Lanka’s target rate over the entire 
sample period but it has been chosen as the target rate since the Central Bank of Sri Lanka has stated in policy 
documents its desires to maintain inflation at mid-single digit levels over the medium term.   
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
po
in
t-
to
-
po
in
t c
ha
n
ge
 (p
er
 
ce
n
t) 
  
12 
 
Measuring potential output, which cannot be observed, is one of the key issues that need to 
be addressed when estimating a monetary policy rule.  Correctly estimating the output gap is 
crucial to obtaining reliable estimates of the monetary policy rule.  There are several 
alternative methods used to estimate potential output: Univariate filtering methods such as 
the Hodrick Prescott filter (HP filter), Baxter King and Christiano-Fitzgerald band pass 
filters as well as multivariate model based methods. 10  Alternative measures of the output 
gap for Sri Lanka based on estimates of potential output using these various methods are 
given in Figure 2.  The figure shows a close correspondence between the alternative 
measures of potential output.  Since the potential output estimate using the HP filter measure 
is available for the longest period, it is chosen for the empirical analysis.  
 
Figure 3: Alternative Measures of the Output Gap 
 
 
The central bank has operated under a monetary targeting framework since the 1980s.  
However, since the commencement of open market operations, monetary policy has been 
conducted to influence the short term interest rate.  Hence, the short term interest rate was 
                                                
10 Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter: Potential output represents a filter that minimises the deviation of actual output 
from the potential output, subject to a penalty on the maximum allowable change in potential growth between 
the two periods. The standard practice is to use a smoothness parameter equal to 1,600 for quarterly data.   
Baxter-King (BK) and Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) band-pass filters: Accommodate business cycle dynamics 
using a range of business cycle frequencies to separate the cyclical and trend components of output. 
Multivariate (MV) filter: A model based approach to estimating potential output.  The multivariate filter is used 
to simulate the potential output by estimating the relationship between growth and other observable variables 
including inflation, capacity utilisation and unemployment.   
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chosen to reflect the monetary policy stance of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  Since there is 
no one interest rate that appropriately reflects the stance of monetary policy over the entire 
sample period, it was necessary to choose a short term interest rate that appropriately 
reflected the monetary policy stance of the Central Bank.  An ‘Effective Policy Rate’ was 
constructed by choosing the policy interest rate that ‘best’ reflected the monetary policy 
stance during each period under consideration.  Until the commencement of open market 
operations the Repo rate was considered as the effective policy interest rate.  Thereafter 
depending on macroeconomic conditions and liquidity conditions in the market either the 
Repo rate or the Reverse Repo rate was chosen as the effective policy rate.  To carry out 
robustness checks, the monetary policy rule was also estimated out using the average 
weighted call market rate (AWCMR) the 91-day Treasury bill rate.  The correlation between 
the AWCMR and the effective policy interest rate was found to be around 0.8, indicating the 
close movement between the policy interest rate and the overnight market interest rate.   
 
Figure 4: Central Bank Policy Interest Rates and Overnight Short Term Interest Rate 
 
 
Sri Lanka being a small open economy is significantly affected by changes in its exchange 
rate.  Hence, the exchange rate has been included in the monetary policy reaction function of 
the Central Bank.  Following Patra and Kapur (2012) the annualised quarter on quarter 
change in the nominal exchange rate was used in the analysis. 
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Figure 5: Rs/US dollar Exchange Rate 
 
 
A Chow breakpoint stability test was carried out on a selected contemporaneous monetary 
policy reaction function.11  Based on the results of the test, two statistically significant breaks 
were detected in 2001 Q1 and 2008 Q1.  The break in 2001 Q1 captures the shift to a free 
floating exchange rate regime while the break in 2008 Q1 captures the impact of the global 
financial crisis.  A dummy variable has been included to take into account these 
extraordinary events that had an undue impact on the volatility of the short term interest rate.   
Contemporaneous and backward looking models were estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS).  Forward looking specifications which include lead values of explanatory 
variables were estimated using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to account for 
possible endogeneity between variables (Clarida et al, 1998).   
Table 1 presents a summary of the results from estimates of alternative contemporaneous 
specifications of the monetary policy reaction function.  Two alternative measures of short 
term interest rate (AWCMR and the effective policy interest rate) were used in the 
estimation. The baseline specifications (column 1 and 3 of Table 1) include 
contemporaneous values for inflation and output gap, and the first lag of the short term 
interest rate to take into account interest smoothing behaviour of the central bank. The 
baseline specifications were augmented with the nominal exchange rate (column 2 and 4 of 
Table 1). Similar estimations were also carried out using the 91-day Treasury bill rate in 
order to perform robustness checks, and the results are given in Table 5 of Annex II. 
                                                
11
 Chow breakpoint stability test can only be done for single equations, and not for a system of equations. 
Hence the break points detected are based on a contemporaneous specification of a monetary policy reaction 
function.   
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Estimates from contemporaneous monetary policy reaction function shows that the 
coefficients on both inflation and output gap remain positive and significant for all 
specifications. The coefficient on inflation is lower than the coefficient on the output gap 
and the long-run coefficient on inflation is less than unity indicating that the Taylor principle 
is not fulfilled. The use of a contemporaneous specification which ignores the lags in the 
transmission of monetary policy could be the reason for this result.  However, the coefficient 
on the output gap is above unity. The exchange rate variable is found to be significant in one 
of the augmented specification (column 2 of Table 1) although the coefficient is small.  
 
Table 1: Estimates of the Contemporaneous Monetary Policy Reaction Function: 
Sample Period: 1996 Q:1 – 2013 Q:2 
Column number 1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable AWCMR EFFECTIVE 
Constant 2.26 2.63 2.34 2.44 
  (2.91)*** (3.41)*** (3.50)*** (3.63)*** 
INFCPIDEV 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.15 
  (2.61)*** (3.18)*** (3.05)*** (3.25)*** 
YGAPSA 0.36 0.37 0.52 0.53 
  (2.69)*** (2.89)*** (4.44)*** (4.52)*** 
AWCMR(-1) 0.75 0.68 
  (10.72)*** (9.04)*** 
EFFECTIVE(-1) 0.73 0.71 
  (11.66)*** (10.54)*** 
TBILL91(-1) 
  
EXCH4(-1) 0.06 0.03 
  (2.24)** (1.19) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.80 0.80 
F-statistic 65.05 53.07 89.63 68.00 
S.E. of regression 1.96 1.90 1.73 1.73 
Long-run coefficient on inflation 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Long-run coefficient on output gap 1.4 1.1 2.0 1.8 
Long-run coefficient on exchange rate 
 
0.2 
 
0.1 
Neutral policy rate 8.9 
 
8.8 
 Notes: 
Absolute value of t-statistics is given in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Estimation is by OLS methodology for the sample period 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 
Output gap measure: Hodrick-Prescott filter 
 
 
Table 2 presents a summary of the results from estimates of a backward looking 
specification of a monetary policy reaction function.  Two alternative measures of short term 
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interest rate (AWCMR and the effective policy interest rate) were used to estimate the 
backward looking monetary policy reaction function. The baseline specifications (column 1 
and 3 of Table 2) included lagged inflation and output gap, and the short term interest rate 
with one lag. The baseline specifications were augmented with the nominal exchange rate 
(column 2 and 4 of Table 2). Similar estimations were also carried out using the 91-day 
Treasury bill rate in order to perform robustness checks, and the results are given in Table 6 
of Annex II. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Estimates of Monetary Policy Reaction Function - Backward Looking Specifications 
Sample Period: 1996 Q:1 – 2013 Q:2 
Column number 1 2 3 4 
Dependent variable AWCMR EFFECTIVE 
Constant 2.84 3.20 3.26 3.33 
  (3.58)*** (4.01)*** (4.55)*** (4.59)*** 
INFCPIDEV(-1) 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.11 
  (2.08)** (2.62)*** (2.20)** (2.30)** 
YGAPSA(-1) 0.51 0.51 0.67 0.67 
  (3.80)*** (3.86)*** (5.38)*** (5.37)*** 
AWCMR(-1) 0.71 0.64 
  (9.64)*** (7.98)*** 
EFFECTIVE(-1) 0.67 0.65 
  (9.59)*** (8.68)*** 
EXCH4(-1) 0.06 0.02 
  (1.95)* (0.69) 
Observations 69 69 69 69 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.80 
F-statistic 68.52 54.57 91.61 68.28 
S.E. of regression 1.92 1.88 1.72 1.73 
Long-run coefficient on inflation 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Long-run coefficient on output gap 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.9 
Long-run coefficient on exchange rate 
 
0.2 
 
0.0 
Neutral policy rate 9.7 
 
9.8 
 Notes: 
Absolute value of t-statistics is given in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Estimation is by OLS methodology for the sample period 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 
Output gap measure: Hodrick-Prescott filter 
 
Estimates from the backward looking monetary policy reaction function show that the 
coefficients on both inflation and output gap remain positive and significant for all 
specifications. However, the long-run coefficient on inflation is less than unity, whereas the 
coefficient on the output gap is greater than one. This result is once again because the 
backward looking specification does not take account of the lags in monetary transmission.  
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The exchange rate variable turns out to be significant in one of the augmented specifications 
(column 2 of Table 2).  
Table 3 presents a summary of the results from estimates of a forward looking specification 
of a monetary policy reaction function.  Similar to the contemporaneous and backward 
looking specifications, the AWCMR and the effective policy interest rate were used as two 
alternative measures of short term interest rate. One quarter ahead inflation and output gap 
together with short term interest rate with one lag were used in the baseline specifications 
(column 1 and 4 of Table 3). The baseline was augmented with a dummy variable to account 
for the structural breaks identified in 2001 and 2008 (column 2 and 5 of Table 3).  In 
addition, the specifications were also augmented with movements in the nominal exchange 
rate (column 3 and 6 of Table 3). Robustness checks were carried out using the 91-day 
Treasury bill rate, and the results are given Table 7 of Annex II. 
 
The coefficients on inflation and the output gap are statistically significant and have the right 
sign.  However, the coefficient on the output gap is larger than the coefficient on inflation.  
The coefficient on lagged interest rate is large and significant implying a relatively high 
degree of interest rate smoothing.  This indicates that the central bank generally changes its 
policy interest rate in small steps in response to macroeconomic developments.  Increasing 
uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment and the monetary transmission mechanism 
have made central banks more cautious in the conduct of monetary policy.  The long run 
coefficient12 on inflation is greater than 1 in all forward looking specifications of the 
monetary policy reaction function indicating that in the forward looking specification of the 
monetary policy rule the Taylor principle13 is satisfied. The long run coefficient on the 
output gap is larger than the coefficient inflation indicating that monetary policy seems to 
react more strongly to fluctuations in output than to deviations in inflation.  The higher 
coefficient on the output gap may reflect a higher preference towards output stabilisation but 
it could also reflect a lower sensitivity of output to the interest rate and hence the need for a 
stronger response of monetary policy towards output stabilisation (Hayo and Hoffman, 
2005).  In emerging markets and developing countries, monetary policy is supposed to react 
more strongly to movements in the exchange rate.  In the forward looking specification the 
coefficient on the exchange rate is of the right sign, indicating that monetary policy is 
tightened in response to depreciation in the exchange rate but the coefficient is very small 
and not significant.  According to Mohanty and Klau (2004), the strength of the monetary 
                                                
12
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
13
 As discussed in Taylor (1999) if the coefficient on inflation is less than one, the real interest would decline 
with a rise in inflation, leading to higher inflation in the future.   
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policy response to the exchange rate depends on whether a central bank is able to use other 
instruments such as intervention in the foreign exchange market, temporary capital controls, 
swaps and other derivative instruments to stabilise the exchange rate.   
Table 3: Estimates of Monetary Policy Reaction Function - Forward Looking Specifications 
Sample Period: 1996 Q:1 – 2013 Q:2 
Column number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable AWCMR EFFECTIVE 
Constant 1.87 -0.91 -1.05 1.68 -0.01 -0.05 
  (2.01)** (-0.25) (-0.28) (1.88)* (0.00) (-0.01) 
INFCPIDEV(+1) 0.29 0.36 0.42 0.28 0.29 0.31 
  (1.96)** (1.79)* (1.96)** (2.71)*** (2.02)** (2.11)** 
YGAPSA(+1) 0.65 0.69 0.59 0.95 0.97 0.94 
  (1.13) (1.21) (1.03) (1.96)** (1.90)* (1.94)* 
AWCMR(-1) 0.72 0.77 0.70 
  (7.68)*** (6.89)*** (5.60)*** 
EFFECTIVE(-1) 0.73 0.78 0.76 
  (9.12)*** (4.86)*** (4.12)*** 
TBILL91(-1) 
  
EXCH4(-1) 0.06 0.02 
  (1.41) (0.58) 
DUMMY 2.02 2.30 1.12 1.16 
  (0.71) (0.81) (0.35) (0.36) 
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Adjusted R-squared 0.62 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.60 0.60 
J-statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S.E. of regression 2.35 2.50 2.52 2.40 2.45 2.44 
Long-run coefficient on inflation 1.0 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.3 
Long-run coefficient on output gap 2.3 3.0 2.0 3.6 4.5 4.0 
Long-run coefficient on exchange rate 
  
0.2 
  
0.1 
Neutral policy rate 6.6 4.8 
 
6.3 5.1 
 Notes: 
Absolute value of t-statistics is given in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Estimation is by GMM methodology for the sample period 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 
Instruments used for GMM estimation: INFCPIDEV(-1), YGAPSA(-1), AWCMR(-1), EFFECTIVE(-1),  
EXCH4(-1) and DUMMY 
Output gap measure: Hodrick-Prescott filter 
 
Figure 5 plots the actual effective rate and the policy interest rate based on the estimates of 
the monetary policy rule from the preferred specification, i.e., the forward looking monetary 
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policy reaction function augmented with a dummy variable (column 5 of Table 3).14  The 
policy interest rate estimated from the model appears to closely track the effective rate 
reasonably well, although there are was some deviation during 2000-2001 and 2006-2007.   
 
Figure 6: Actual Versus Estimated Effective Policy Rate  
Based on the Forward Looking Specification of the Monetary Policy Rule 
 
 
Determining the neutral policy rate15 is vital for the estimation of a monetary policy rule.  It 
is possible to estimate this value using a general equilibrium model of the economy.  
However, a crude estimate can be obtained from the estimation of the Taylor rule itself.  The 
estimates of the neutral policy interest rate in the contemporaneous specification is around 
8.9 per cent while for the backward looking specification it is around 9.8 per cent indicating 
the need for high interest rates if the lags in transmission of monetary policy are not taken 
into consideration by policy makers. According to estimates of forward looking 
specifications of the monetary policy reaction function, the neutral policy rate is around 6.2 - 
6.6 per cent. 16 Assuming a higher level of desired inflation during the first sub sample 
period results in a neutral policy rate estimate of between 10-11 per cent.  
                                                
14
 The selected specification has a Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.77, which is approximately close to the desired 
level of 2, the level of serial correlation is not significant. According to the Ljung-Box Q-statistic the null 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation can be accepted. 
 
15
 The neutral policy rate is the policy rate at which the economy is assumed to be growing at its potential level 
and inflation is maintained at the desired level. 
16
 However, the estimates of the neutral policy rate should be treated as indicative and within wide confidence 
intervals, as the assessment of the neutral rate is conditional upon the view on the rate of potential output 
growth (Patra and Kapur, 2010).   
(continued…) 
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Figure 7: Interest Rate Gap and Inflation Gap 
 
Figure 7 plots the interest rate gap which is the difference between the effective policy rate 
and the interest rate implied by the estimated monetary policy rule and the inflation gap 
which is the difference between the inflation rate and targeted inflation. The figure shows an 
inverse relationship between the interest rate gap and the inflation gap. Periods during which 
the actual interest rate was close to the implied rate implied by the estimated Taylor rule, 
actual inflation is closer to the desired/targeted rate of inflation.  In periods where there is a 
deviation of the effective policy rate from the policy rate implied by the Taylor rule, the 
larger the gap between actual inflation and the desired/targeted rate of inflation.  A widening 
gap is observed during the period 2007-2008, coinciding with the Global Financial Crisis. 
A recursive regression was carried out for the backward looking specification in column 3 of 
Table 2 to assess the evolution of the coefficients on the inflation gap and output gap over 
time. The results are presented in Figure 7.  According to the estimates the response of 
monetary policy to deviations of inflation from the desired level and the output gap has 
strengthened since 2007, reaching a peak in 2009.  The response of monetary policy to 
inflation has stabilised thereafter, while the response to the output gap appears to have 
gradually declined reflecting the improvement in the transmission of monetary policy.  The 
coefficient on the output gap has been consistently higher than the coefficient on the 
inflation gap reflecting the lower sensitivity of output to interest rates. 
 
Figure 8: Recursive Estimates of Coefficients of Inflation Gap and Output Gap 
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a. Inflation Gap  
 
b. Output Gap  
 
 
Since there appears to be a definite shift in the coefficients on inflation gap and output gap 
after 2007, the monetary policy reaction function was estimated over two sub sample 
periods.  The first sample period covered the period 1996 Q:1 to 2007 Q:4, while the second 
sample period was from 2008 Q:1 to 2013 Q:2.  Due to insufficient number of observations 
in the second sample period the results from that period are not reported.  However, 
comparing the results from the first sample period and the entire sample provide some 
important insights into the changes that have taken place in the conduct of monetary policy.  
The long run coefficient on inflation was less than one which was below the threshold 
prescribed by the Taylor principle, implying that during this period monetary policy has 
reacted less than proportional to changes in inflation.  On the other hand, for the entire 
sample period, the long run coefficient was above 1, indicating that during the second 
sample period the Taylor principle was met.  With monetary policy reacting more than 
proportionately to the inflation gap, there is an increase in the real interest rate leading to 
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lower inflation.  Further the long run coefficient on output gap is higher during the second 
period indicating a higher weight on output stabilisation.   
 
Table 4: Estimates of Monetary Policy Reaction Function - Forward Looking Specifications 
Sample Periods: 1996:Q1 to 2007:Q4 and 1996 Q:1 to 2013 Q:2 
Column number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Sample period 1996Q1 2007Q4 1996Q1 2013Q2 
Constant 2.28 9.52 9.53 1.68 -0.01 -0.05 
 
(1.43) (1.55) (1.52) (1.88)* (0.00) (-0.01) 
INFCPIDEV(+1) 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31 
 
(1.46) (1.59) (1.63) (2.71)*** (2.02)** (2.11)** 
YGAPSA(+1) 1.18 1.17 1.15 0.95 0.97 0.94 
 
(1.86)* (1.96)* (1.98)** (1.96)** (1.90)* (1.94)* 
EFFECTIVE(-1) 0.68 0.42 0.36 0.73 0.78 0.76 
 
(6.29)*** (1.65) (1.26) (9.12)*** (4.86)*** (4.12)*** 
EXCH4(-1) 
  
0.06 
  
0.02 
   
(1.25) 
  
(0.58) 
DUMMY 
 
-4.50 -4.20 
 
1.12 1.16 
  
(-1.07) (-1.00) 
 
(0.35) (0.36) 
Observations 47 47 47 68 68 68 
Adjusted R-squared 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.61 0.60 0.60 
J-statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S.E. of regression 2.86 2.79 2.76 2.40 2.45 2.44 
Long-run coefficient on inflation 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.3 
Long-run coefficient on output gap 3.6 2.0 1.8 3.6 4.5 4.0 
Long-run coefficient on exchange rate 
  
0.1 
  
0.1 
Neutral policy rate 7.0 8.7 
 
6.3 5.1 
 
Notes: 
Absolute value of t-statistics is given in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Estimation is by GMM methodology for the effective interest rate 
Instruments used for GMM estimation: INFCPIDEV(-1), YGAPSA(-1), AWCMR(-1), EFFECTIVE(-1),  
EXCH4(-1) and DUMMY 
Output gap measure: Hodrick-Prescott filter 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The paper provides an empirical characterisation of the monetary policy reaction function of 
the Central Bank of Sri Lanka over the period 1996Q1 to 2013Q2.  .  Although the 
objectives of the Central Bank have changed during this period as have its operating 
methods, the monetary policy stance of the Central Bank appears to have been well 
characterised by movements in the short term interest rate.  Estimates of the Central Bank’s 
monetary policy reaction function provide an understanding of the relative weights placed 
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by the Central Bank on inflation and output during the period for which the analysis was 
conducted.   
The estimates provide evidence of a change in the coefficients for the inflation gap and the 
output gap during the period of analysis, in particular with a stronger response of monetary 
policy to the inflation gap and the output gap being observed since 2007.  There is also 
evidence of a greater weight being placed on output stabilisation, which could reflect both 
the preference of the central bank and structural issues relating to the slower transmission of 
monetary policy.  A relatively strong response to the output gap may be attributed to a lower 
sensitivity of output to the interest rate.  However, there appears to be a shift in monetary 
policy from greater responsiveness to the output gap to more focus on inflation.  The 
empirical analysis however, does not provide any evidence that monetary policy is 
responsive to the exchange rate.   
The challenges discussed previously in the estimation of monetary policy reaction functions 
were encountered in the case of Sri Lanka as well.  Generating reliable estimates of potential 
output is particularly challenging given the structural changes that have taken place in the 
economy.  Difficulties also arise in determining the equilibrium real interest rate which may 
therefore give rise to policy error.  Further identifying a single targeted or desired inflation 
rate for the entire period of the analysis is challenging.   
Taylor type monetary policy rules provide a simple and transparent framework for 
conducting monetary policy (Taylor, 2008).  However, mechanically following rule based 
monetary policy formulation is not what is recommended.  Monetary policy rules provide 
only a guide to policy makers in their decision making process.  Judgment is required when 
evaluating macroeconomic developments in the decision making process.  Unexpected 
events may also require changes in the interest rate to smoothen the volatility in financial 
markets.  While monetary policy rules are useful to guide monetary policy formulation 
slavishly following simple policy rules may not always lead to optimal monetary policy 
making (Svensson, 2003; Woodford, 2001).   
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Annex I 
Table 1: Data Description 
Variable Name Definition Period Source 
AWCMR Average weighted call money rate (quarterly average) 1996 – 2013:Q2 CBSL
1 
EFFECTIVE Effective policy rate 1996 - 2012:Q2 CBSL 
TBILL91 91 day Treasury bill rate 1996 - 2012:Q2 CBSL 
EXCH4 Annualised quarter-on-quarter variation in 
the monthly average exchange rate 1996 - 2012:Q2 CBSL 
INFCPIDEV 
Deviation of actual inflation (change of 
the Colombo Consumers’ Price Index 
(CCPI)) from the indicative inflation 
projection of 5 per cent 
1996 - 2012:Q2 
DCS2 
Author’s 
estimates 
YGAPSA Output gap measure (computed using 
seasonally adjusted GDP) 1996 - 2012:Q2 
Author’s 
estimates 
DUMMY 2001:Q1-Q3 and 2008:Q1-Q3 are set to 0 - - 
1/ CBSL – Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
2/ DCS – Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka 
 
Table 2: Sylised Facts (Averge for Period)  
Per cent 
Period Headline 
Inflation 
(CCPI) 
Real GDP 
Growth Rate 
(YRATE) 
Output Gap 
(YGAPSA 
Average 
Weighted 
Call Market 
Rate 
(AWCMR) 
Depreciation 
of Rs/US $ 
Exchange 
Rate 
(EXCH4) 
1996-2013Q2 10.0 5.2 0.0 11.6 5.1 
1996-2001 10.1 4.0 0.7 14.5 9.3 
2002-2007 10.8 5.4 -0.6 10.8 3.1 
2008-2013Q2 9.1 6.4 -0.1 9.5 2.6 
Sources: Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Department of Census and Statistics, Author’s calculations 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: 1996 – 2013 
 AWCMR EFFECTIVE TBILL91 EXCH4 INFCPIDEV YGAPSA 
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 11.64 11.31 11.69 5.07 5.02 -0.01 
Median 11.05 10.50 11.29 5.15 4.20 -0.20 
Maximum 23.83 22.00 21.30 37.50 23.40 6.68 
Minimum 7.02 7.00 6.98 -18.90 -4.30 -5.57 
Std. Dev. 3.80 3.82 3.67 8.98 5.34 1.78 
Skewness 1.24 1.11 0.72 1.00 1.05 0.41 
Kurtosis 4.57 3.62 2.67 6.21 4.42 5.59 
Jarque-Bera 25.00 15.46 6.43 41.83 18.76 21.57 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sum 814.47 791.46 818.13 355.10 351.10 -0.51 
Sum Sq. Dev. 994.44 1007.50 928.55 5566.28 1970.85 219.31 
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Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics: 1996 – 2007 
 AWCMR EFFECTIVE TBILL91 EXCH4 INFCPIDEV YGAPSA 
Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 
Mean 12.63 11.72 12.13 6.21 5.44 0.05 
Median 12.27 11.50 11.79 5.65 5.75 -0.20 
Maximum 23.83 22.00 21.30 35.40 16.50 6.68 
Minimum 7.48 7.00 7.00 -18.90 -1.60 -5.57 
Std. Dev. 3.88 3.45 3.56 7.54 4.29 1.98 
Skewness 1.18 1.25 0.72 0.54 0.23 0.44 
Kurtosis 4.27 4.75 2.92 8.24 2.52 5.19 
Jarque-Bera 14.39 18.70 4.11 57.35 0.88 11.14 
Probability 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.65 0.00 
Sum 606.03 562.71 582.34 298.20 261.10 2.32 
Sum Sq. Dev. 706.11 559.17 595.92 2674.85 863.91 184.57 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics: 2008 – 2013 
 AWCMR EFFECTIVE TBILL91 EXCH4 INFCPIDEV YGAPSA 
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Mean 9.47 10.40 10.72 2.59 4.09 -0.13 
Median 8.48 8.75 9.48 -0.60 1.95 0.04 
Maximum 15.09 19.00 18.39 37.50 23.40 1.72 
Minimum 7.02 7.00 6.98 -10.60 -4.30 -2.49 
Std. Dev. 2.57 4.48 3.80 11.32 7.17 1.28 
Skewness 1.17 1.25 0.93 1.68 1.60 -0.40 
Kurtosis 2.86 2.88 2.48 5.61 4.58 2.02 
Jarque-Bera 5.02 5.74 3.45 16.63 11.64 1.46 
Probability 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.48 
Sum 208.44 228.75 235.79 56.90 90.00 -2.83 
Sum Sq. Dev. 138.53 421.83 302.46 2693.07 1079.50 34.27 
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Table 4: Unit Root Tests 
Variable 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic 
t-Statistic Probability 
AWCMR -2.88983 0.0518 
EFFECTIVE -2.33379 0.1645 
TBILL91 -2.64335 0.0895 
EXCH4 -5.06895 0.0001 
INFCPIDEV -3.92929 0.0031 
YGAPSA -3.65812 0.0069 
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Annex II 
 
Table 5: Estimates of the Contemporaneous Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
Column number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable AWCMR EFFECTIVE TBILL91 
Constant 2.26 2.63 2.34 2.44 1.74 1.98 
  (2.91)*** (3.41)*** (3.50)*** (3.63)*** (2.93)*** (3.34)*** 
INFCPIDEV 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.13 
  (2.61)*** (3.18)*** (3.05)*** (3.25)*** (2.79)*** (3.30)*** 
YGAPSA 0.36 0.37 0.52 0.53 0.41 0.42 
  (2.69)*** (2.89)*** (4.44)*** (4.52)*** (4.38)*** (4.57)*** 
AWCMR(-1) 0.75 0.68 
  (10.72)*** (9.04)*** 
EFFECTIVE(-1) 0.73 0.71 
  (11.66)*** (10.54)*** 
TBILL91(-1) 0.80 0.75 
  (14.28)*** (12.59)*** 
EXCH4(-1) 0.06 0.03 0.04 
  (2.24)** (1.19) (1.98)** 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Adjusted R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.86 
F-statistic 65.05 53.07 89.63 68.00 137.94 109.07 
S.E. of regression 1.96 1.90 1.73 1.73 1.39 1.36 
Long-run coefficient on 
inflation 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Long-run coefficient on 
output gap 1.4 1.1 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.7 
Long-run coefficient on 
exchange rate 
 
0.2 
 
0.1 
 
0.2 
Neutral policy rate 8.9 
 
8.8 
 
8.8 
 
Notes: 
Absolute value of t-statistics is given in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Estimation method: OLS 
Sample period: 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 
Output gap measure: HP filter 
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Table 6: Estimates of the Backward Looking Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
Column number 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable AWCMR EFFECTIVE TBILL91 
Constant 
 
2.84 3.20 3.26 3.33 2.44 2.68 
  
 
(3.58)*** (4.01)*** (4.55)*** (4.59)*** (3.91)*** (4.24)*** 
INFCPIDEV(-1) 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.13 
  
 
(2.08)** (2.62)*** (2.20)** (2.30)** (2.79)*** (3.23)*** 
YGAPSA(-1) 
 
0.51 0.51 0.67 0.67 0.49 0.49 
  
 
(3.80)*** (3.86)*** (5.38)*** (5.37)*** (5.04)*** (5.13)*** 
AWCMR(-1) 
 
0.71 0.64 
  
 
(9.64)*** (7.98)*** 
EFFECTIVE(-1) 0.67 0.65 
  
 
(9.59)*** (8.68)*** 
TBILL91(-1) 
 
0.74 0.69 
  
 
(12.22)*** (10.60)*** 
EXCH4(-1) 
 
0.06 0.02 0.03 
  
 
(1.95)* (0.69) (1.69)* 
Observations 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Adjusted R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.86 0.87 
F-statistic 68.52 54.57 91.61 68.28 141.91 110.20 
S.E. of regression 1.92 1.88 1.72 1.73 1.37 1.36 
Long-run coefficient on 
inflation  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Long-run coefficient on 
output gap 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.6 
Long-run coefficient on 
exchange rate 
 
0.2 
 
0.0 
 
0.1 
Neutral policy rate 9.7 
 
9.8 
 
9.4 
 
Notes: 
Absolute value of t-statistics is given in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Estimation method: OLS 
Sample period: 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 
Output gap measure: HP filter 
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Table 7: Estimates of the Forward Looking Monetary Policy Reaction Function 
Column number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Dependent variable AWCMR EFFECTIVE TBILL91 
Constant 1.87 -0.91 2.12 -1.05 1.68 -0.01 1.71 1.88 -0.05 1.96 -2.40 2.35 -2.34 
  
(2.01)** (-0.25) (2.20)** (-0.28) (1.88)* (0.00) (1.88)* (2.10)** (-0.01) (1.63) (-0.72) (1.46) (-0.65) 
INFCPIDEV(+1) 0.29 0.36 0.34 0.42 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.25 0.31 0.34 0.44 0.42 0.52 
  
(1.96)** (1.79)* (2.44)** (1.96)** (2.71)*** (2.02)** (2.72)*** (3.41)*** (2.11)** (3.45)*** (2.34)** (2.81)*** (2.02)** 
YGAPSA(+1) 0.65 0.69 0.52 0.59 0.95 0.97 0.92 1.01 0.94 0.57 0.66 0.45 0.55 
  
(1.13) (1.21) (0.93) (1.03) (1.96)** (1.90)* (1.98)** (1.94)* (1.94)* (1.65)* (1.61) (1.20) (1.30) 
AWCMR(-1) 0.72 0.77 0.64 0.70 
   
 
     
  
(7.68)*** (6.89)*** (5.93)*** (5.60)*** 
   
 
     
EFFECTIVE(-1) 
    
0.73 0.78 0.71 0.72 0.76 
    
  
    
(9.12)*** (4.86)*** (7.72)*** (8.21)*** (4.12)*** 
    
TBILL91(-1) 
       
 
 
0.68 0.77 0.60 0.70 
  
       
 
 
(5.54)*** (5.39)*** (2.89)*** (3.09)*** 
EXCH4(-1) 
  
0.06 0.06 
  
0.03  0.02 
  
0.05 0.05 
  
  
(1.52) (1.41) 
  
(0.77)  (0.58) 
  
(1.10) (0.95) 
REER(-1)        0.03      
 
       (0.48)      
DUMMY 
 
2.02 
 
2.30 
 
1.12 
 
 1.16 
 
3.14 
 
3.36 
  
 
(0.71) 
 
(0.81) 
 
(0.35) 
 
 (0.36) 
 
(1.16) 
 
(1.23) 
Observations 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Adjusted R-squared 0.62 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.61 0.60 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.72 0.65 0.69 0.60 
J-statistic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
S.E. of regression 2.35 2.50 2.33 2.52 2.40 2.45 2.39 2.45 2.44 1.96 2.20 2.07 2.35 
Long-run coefficient 
on inflation 
1.0 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.1 1.9 1.0 1.7 
Long-run coefficient 
on output gap 
2.3 3.0 1.5 2.0 3.6 4.5 3.1 3.6 4.0 1.8 2.9 1.1 1.8 
Long-run coefficient 
on exchange rate   
0.2 0.2 
  
0.1 0.1 0.1 
  
0.1 0.2 
Neutral policy rate 6.6 
   
6.3 
  
 
 
6.2 
   
Notes: 
Absolute value of t-statistics is given in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
Estimation method: GMM  
Instruments used for GMM estimation: INFCPIDEV(-1), YGAPSA(-1), AWCMR(-1), EFFECTIVE(-1),  TBILL91(-1), 
EXCH4(-1) and DUMMY 
Sample period: 1996Q1 - 2013Q2 
Output gap measure: HP filter 
